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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SANDS, et al.,

j

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,

)
)

V.

'
)

MORONGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

)
)
)

)

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of San Bernardino
The Honorable LeRoy A. Simmons, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division Two
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 2, 1986, taxpayers James Sands and Jean Bertolette
("Petitioners") filed a complaint and motion for preliminary
injunction against the Morongo Unified School District
("District" ) in the Superior Court for the County of San
Bernardino.

(C.T. 1.)

The complaint seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief to restrain the District from including
invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies, based on
alleged violations of the first amendment of the United States
Constitution, and article I, section 4; article XVI, section 5,
and article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution.
7. )
The court denied Petitioners’ request for preliminary

1

(C.T.

injunction in an order issued June 24, 1986.

(C.T. 10*11.)

Both

parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment,
Petitioners on August 26, 1987, and Respondents on September 22,
1987.

(C.T. 19, 99.)

On December 3, 1987, the court granted

Petitioners* motion for summary judgment and by the same order
denied the District’s motion for summary judgment.

(C.T. 177.)

The District appealed to California’s Fourth District Court
of Appeal, and on September 19, 1989, that court reversed.
V.

Sands

Morongo Unified School Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 45 (1989).

The

court’s ruling allows the District to continue its practice of
including invocations and benedictions at the graduation
ceremonies.

This court granted Petitioners’ petition for review

on December 7, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Morongo Unified School District operates four high
schools in San Bernardino County.

(C.T. 24.)

Traditionally,

invocations and benedictions are included at the high schools
graduation ceremonies.

(C.T. 25.)

This tradition dates back

twenty-two years at Yucca Valley High School (’’Yucca Valley”) and
more than fifty years at Twenty-Nine Palms High School ( TwentyNine Palms").

(C.T. 106.)

Sky and Monument High Schools ("Sky"

and "Monument") have included invocations and benedictions in
their graduation ceremonies since 1977 and 1978, respectively.
(C.T. 160.)
The invocations and benedictions comprise a fraction of the
entire graduation ceremonies.

Generally, the invocations and
2

benedictions last only thirty to sixty seconds each (C.T. 108),
while an entire ceremony lasts from forty-five to ninety minutes.
(C.T. 107.)

At Yucca Valley and Twenty-Nine Palms, the

graduation ceremonies have in the past included the following
stages:

a) a processional; b) a presentation of colors; c) the

pledge of allegiance; d) the national anthem; e) the invocation;
f) a welcome by the class president; g) two senior student
speakers; h) a musical selection; i) another student speaker; j)
two salutary addresses by students; k) another musical selection;
1) a student singer; m) the valedictorian address; n) the
presentation of the honor student; o) the presentation of the
senior class; p) the acceptance of the senior class; q) the roll
call and presentation of diplomas; r) a musical selection by a
choir; s) another student singer; t) the benediction, and u) a
recessional.

(C.T. 26-27. )

The ceremonies take place after school hours (C.T. 162) on
the high schools* grounds.

Sands, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 50 51.

For example, the 1986 graduation ceremony at Yucca Valley was
held on the football field.

(C.T. 71.)

Generally, only

graduating seniors and their immediate families attend.
158.)

(C.T.

Attendance by the graduates is voluntary and is not a

prerequisite for graduating.

(C.T. 161.)

technically graduated prior to the event.

Participants have
(C.T. 162.)

At Yucca Valley, the senior class president selects all
graduation speakers with the assistance of the vice principa
(C.T. 162.)

The principal at Yucca Valley has the right of final

3

selection of the speakers.

(C.T. 107.)

However, school

officials have never taken an active role in determining who
speaks at the Yucca Valley graduations, with the exception of the
1986 ceremony.

(C.T. 164.)

That year, the District

Superintendent of Schools, Joseph Boeckx, requested that Mark
Weisberg, Yucca Valley’s vice principal, "[keep] the graduation
program in line with past graduations" and include a clergy
person.

(C.T. 169.)

This involvement was strictly in response

to the inception of this litigation.

(C.T. 164.)

Mr. Boeckx’s

request was communicated to the senior class president, who then
made the final selections of Pastor Kimball to deliver the
invocation (C.T. 68) and a teacher to present the benediction.
Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d at 51.
Speakers selected in the past to deliver the invocations and
benedictions have included both lay and clergy persons.
162.)

(C.T.

In 1985, the year preceding commencement of this action, a

youth pastor at the Evangelical Free Church delivered the
invocation at Yucca Valley’s graduation ceremony (C.T. 162) and
an employee of the School District presented the benediction.
(C.T. 162.)
Twenty-Nine Palms’ senior class president and student body
representatives have final selection authority over who speaks at
their graduation.

(C.T. 107.)

In 1985, they selected a

Presbyterian minister to present the invocation and a Catholic
priest to deliver the benediction.

(C.T. 107.)

The record does

not indicate how graduation speakers are selected at Monument and
4

Sky.

However, Protestant ministers delivered the invocations and

benedictions at both schools in 1985.

gaqds, 214 Cal. App. 3d at

51.
In 1986, Yucca Valley’s vice principal requested that the
speakers keep the language of the invocations and benedictions as
secular and nonsectarian as possible.

(C.T. 127-28.)

In

compliance with this request, the speakers made references only
to "heavenly father" and "lord" in the invocation, and "father"
in the benediction.
specific deity.

(C.T. 94-95.)

(C.T. 94-95.)

Neither speaker referenced a

The only language with which

Petitioners take issue appears in those invocations and
benedictions.

Sands, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 50 n.2, 51 n.3.

There are no calculable expenses specifically attributable
to the inclusion of invocations and benedictions in the high
school graduation ceremonies.

(C.T. 162.)

All speakers at the

ceremonies, whether employees of the District, clergy, or
students, participate as volunteers and are not compensated out
of district funds.

(C.T. 162.)

Funds budgeted by the District

for graduation ceremonies are expended for cap and gown rental
(C.T. 131), printing of programs, and security.

(C.T. 171.)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Is the practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment of the United States Constitution?
2. Is the practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies
constitutional under the Establishment and No Preference Clauses
of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution?
5

3
Is the practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies
constitutional under article XVI, section 5 of the California
Constitution, which restricts state aid for religious purposes.
4.
Is the practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies
constitutional under article IX, section 8 of the California
Constitution, which restricts teaching of sectarian doctrine in
public schools?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court should uphold the decision of the court of appeal.
The District’s practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution.

The Supreme Court has not specifically

decided the constitutionality of invocations and benedictions at
public high school graduation ceremonies.

It has, however,

applied the test developed in T.emon v. Kurtzm^, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), to many cases requiring an Establishment Clause analysis.
Under Lemon, a practice must:

1) have a secular, rather than

religious purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and 3) not lead to excessive governmental
involvement.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.

The District’s invocations and benedictions serve a
sufficiently secular purpose under the first prong of Lemon when
examined in the context of the high school graduation ceremonies.
Exclusive focus by a court on the religious nature of a practice
without analyzing its context is clear error.
465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).

Lynch v_. Donnelly

When viewed in the context of the

6

secular graduation ceremonies, the District’s practice of
including brief invocations and benedictions is constitutional.
The District’s practice is constitutional under the second
prong of Lemon as well because the practice does not have the
effect of endorsing religion and any promotional effect it has on
religion is at most incidental, remote, and indirect.

"[W]here

the government’s act of recognition or accommodation is passive
and symbolic, any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to
present a realistic risk of establishment."

County of Allegheny

V. ACLU. 492 U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3092 (1989).
The District’s practice is also permissible under the third
prong of the Lemon test because it does not involve supervision
or funding of the type sufficient to constitute excessive
entanglement with any religious institution.
621.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at

Thus, the District’s practice of including invocations and

benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies passes all
three prongs of the Lemon test and is therefore constitutional
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Lemon test is not the only analysis the Court employs to
determine the constitutionality of practices challenged under the
Establishment Clause.

The District’s practice is more

appropriately scrutinized under the historical analysis set forth
in Marsh v. Chambers. 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court found
that invocations in legislative settings serve a permissible
ceremonial function.

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch _y_^

Donnelly, which likened the legitimate secular purpose of
7

legislative invocations to courtroom invocations, suggests that
the Marsh decision may be interpreted to validate invocations in
general.

Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

The District recognizes that the courts are particularly
vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause
in the school setting.

However, the Court distinguishes official

school prayers from permissible "patriotic or ceremonial"
practices in which school children are officially encouraged to
participate.

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).

The District’s practice has none of the repetitive and
indoctrinational qualities which characterize school prayers
promulgated in state statutes or policies.

The District’s

practice of including invocations and benedictions in its high
school graduation ceremonies serves a legitimate ceremonial
function and is therefore constitutional under the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution.
The District’s inclusion of brief invocations and
benedictions withstands analysis under the relevant provisions of
the California Constitution.

The practice is permissible under

the Establishment and No Preference Clauses of article I, section
4 of the California Constitution.

Because there are few

California cases addressing the California Constitution s
Establishment Clause in detail, it is appropriate for the court
to apply the analysis used by federal courts in addressing the
United States Constitution’s Establishment Clause.

Our analysis

demonstrating that the District’s practice is valid under the
8

federal Establishment Clause shows that the District’s practice
is permissible under the California Constitution’s Establishment
Clause as well.
Likewise, the District’s practice is permissible under the
California Constitution’s No Preference Clause when analyzed
according to the preference test developed in Fox v. City of los
Angeles. 22 Cal. 3d 792 ( 1978) and Okrand v. City of Los Angeles,
207 Cal. App. 3d 566 ( 1989).

The District’s practice of

including brief invocations and benedictions does not exhibit a
preference for religion because the District is willing to
recognize representatives of various religions in its ceremonies.
The District’s practice is also permissible'under article
XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution.

The relevant part

of this section prohibits the District from granting anything in
aid of religious purposes, including "any official involvement,
whatever its form, which has the direct, immediate, and
substantial effect of promoting religious purposes."

California

Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.l2
(1974).

The District’s practice is constitutional because any

aid to religion which results from the inclusion of brief
invocations and benedictions in otherwise wholly secular
ceremonies neither directly nor substantially promotes religion,
nor does it implicate the District’s authority or prestige in aid
of religious purposes.
Finally, the District’s practice is permissible under
article IX, section 8 of the California Constitution because no
9

direct or indirect teaching of sectarian or denominational
doctrine occurs.

Cal. Const, art. IX, § 8.

"Teach" is defined

as meaning "to conduct through a course of studies" or "to
present in a classroom lecture or discussion."
New International Dictionary 2346 (1986).

Webster’s Third

The unique

circumstances of the graduation ceremonies show that no teaching
is intended and none occurs.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT’S PRACTICE OF INCLUDING BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND
BENEDICTIONS AT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION CEREMONIES IS
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE ABSOLUTE
SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE ACTIVITIES.
The District’s practice is consistent with the United States

Supreme Court’s policy of accommodation and neutrality toward
issues affecting both church and state.

The Court has

consistently declined to interpret the words of the Establishment
Clause to require an absolute wall of separation between church
and state activities.

While the Establishment Clause does

'*forbid[] an established church or anything approaching it,"
Lynch. 465 U.S, at 673. the Court has never thought it either
"possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation .
..."
NvQuist.

Committee

for Pub.

Educ.

and Religious Liberty v.

413 U.S. 756. 760 (1973).

Rather, the words, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion," U.S. Const, amend. I, have been
construed as "affirmatively mandat[ing] accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."
10

Lynch. 465 U.S. at 673.

The government, therefore, is to be

neutral, while "respect[ing] the religious nature of our people
and accommodat [ ing ] the public service to their spiritual needs.
Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).

To require anything

less would lead to a "callous indifference" toward religion that
was never intended by the Establishment Clause.
Petitioners allege that the District’s practice of including
brief invocations and benedictions at its high school graduation
ceremonies violates the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.

To determine the

constitutionality of such challenges to the Establishment Clause,
the Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602.

To be constitutionally valid according

to Lemon. a practice must:

1) have a secular rather than

religious purpose; 2) have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and 3) not lead to excessive governmental
involvement.

Id^ at 612-13.

The Lemon test has been applied in

the majority of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases.
The United States Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the constitutionality of invocations and benedictions
at public high school graduation ceremonies.

Two California

appellate decisions, Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d 45, and Bennett v^.
Livermore Unified School Dist.. 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012 (1987),
each applied Lemon with different results.

However, the Sands

analysis, finding the challenged practice constitutional, is
11

consistent with other Supreme Court decisions applying the
guidelines enumerated in Lemon»
A.

Brief Invocations and Benedictions at High School
Graduation Ceremonies Are Constitutional Because Their
Primary Purpose Is Secular* Not Religious*

The Court has determined that invocations serve the
"legitimate secular purposel] of solemnizing public occasions."
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Furthermore,

a practice need not serve an exclusively secular purpose to be
constitutional under the purpose prong of Lemon.
at 681 n.6.

Lynch. 465 U.S.

Rather, a court will invalidate a practice on the

ground that the practice lacks a secular purpose only when it
concludes that the activity was motivated wholly by religious
considerations.

Id. at 680.

Although Petitioners allege that

the District’s invocations and benedictions are religious by
nature, the practice is nonetheless constitutional because the
District’s purpose for maintaining it is legitimately secular.
The Court examines the religious character of an activity
in the context of the government’s purpose for promulgating it.
See School Dist. of Abington Township. Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38 (1985); and Stone v.
Graham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).

Exclusive focus by a court on the

religious nature of a practice without consideration of its
context is clear error.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.

Thus, the Sands

court correctly refuted the Bennett court’s finding that, because
an invocation is a "religious activity in itself,” it does not
pass the purpose prong of Lemon.

Bennett. 193 Cal. App. 3d at
12

1020 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 43 n.22 and jCaren B. v. Treen,
653 F.2d. 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981)).

The proper inquiry is "not

whether the challenged conduct is religious in nature, but
whether the religious activity is being used for a secular
purpose .

.

.

Sands. 214 Cal. App. 3d at 57 (citing Lyn^,

465 U.S. at 681 n.6).
In Lynch, the city owned all the components of a retail
merchants’ Christmas display, including a creche.

The Court

conceded that the creche was a Christian religious symbol.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the district court erred in
focusing almost exclusively on the creche in its determination
that the city had no secular purpose for the display.
U.S. at 680.

Lynch, 465

Instead, the Supreme Court accepted the city’s

claim that its purpose for including the creche in the display
was to "depict[] the historical origins of this traditional event
long recognized as a National Holiday."

Id^

The Court concluded

that, in the context of the Christmas season, and in a display of
wholly secular holiday symbols such as Christmas trees and
reindeer, there was "insufficient evidence to establish that the
inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort
to express . .

. subtle governmental advocacy of a particular

religious message.”

Id, at 680.

The practice in the present case, like that in Lynch,
withstands the purpose prong of the bemon analysis when
appropriately scrutinized in its contextual setting.

The

invocations and benedictions comprise only a fraction of an
13

otherwise wholly secular ceremony, just as the creche in Lynch is
only one component in a display of numerous secular holiday
symbols.

The invocations and benedictions last only thirty to

sixty seconds in a ceremony that runs from forty-five to ninety
minutes.

They are only two of a total of twenty-one elements

that make up the graduation ceremony.

Inclusion of other

ceremonial elements such as the pledge of allegiance, the
national anthem, the processional, and the recessional, clearly
indicates that the District’s purpose is ceremonial.

When

examined under the Lynch contextual analysis, there is no
evidence that the District’s inclusion of invocations and
benedictions at its graduation ceremonies is a purposeful effort
to express advocacy for a particular religious message.

The

practice serves a legitimate secular interest and is therefore
constitutional under the purpose prong of the temon test.
B.

The Inclusion of Brief Invocations and Benedictions at
the District’s High School Graduation Ceremonies Is
Constitutional Because it Does Not Have the Effect of
Endorsing Rel igioHj,

The Court has not arrived at a concise definition of what
constitutes the advancement or inhibition of religion under the
second prong of Lemon.

However, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence

in Lynch set forth the most definitive analysis to date.

"The

effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval."
J., concurring).

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (0 Connor,

As part of an endorsement analysis, the Court

14

considers whether a challenged practice only incidentally and
remotely benefits religion.

Where this is the case» a practice

does not have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion.

Id.

at 683; County of Allegheny. 109 S. Ct. at 3092.
In Lynch. Justice O’Connor concurred with the majority that
the city’s inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display did
not violate the Establishment Clause because the practice was not
understood by the public to be a governmental endorsement of the
religious aspect of the holiday.

Lynch. 465 U.S. at 692.

The

Lynch endorsement analysis was followed in County of Allegheny,
where the Court upheld a county’s practice of placing a menorah
next to a Christmas tree during the holiday season.
Allegheny. 109 S. Ct. 3086.

County of

Lynch also applied endorsement

language to reaffirm other decisions made prior to Lemon in which
the Court upheld practices challenged under the Establishment
Clause, such as Everson v. Bd. of Educ. . 330 U.S. 1 ( 1947 )
(public funding for busing children to church-sponsored schools),
Walz v. Tax Comm’n. 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for
church properties), and Zorach. 343 U.S. 306 (released-time
programs for religious training of public school children).
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 682.
Application of the foregoing analysis to the facts in the
case at bar compels the same result reached by the court below,
"that the religious effect of the invocation[s] and
benediction!s] is remote and incidental."
3d at 59.

Sands. 214 Cal. App.

Invocations are as much an accepted part of public
15

ceremonies as creches are an accepted part of Christmas holiday
displays.

The District’s practice, like the practice in Lyncji,

is not generally perceived by the public as a governmental
endorsement of religion.

Any beneficial effect the District’s

practice has on religion is certainly more remote than the effect
of the roenorah in Countv of Allegheny or the effect of the
figurine of the Christ child in Lynchi both of which were
displayed throughout the holiday season.

Likewise, any

beneficial effect the District’s practice has on religion is far
more remote than the effects of the practices of public funding
to private schools, tax exemptions, and religious training upheld
in prior decisions.

Therefore, any incidental benefit to

religion the District's ceremonial practice may confer does not
constitute an endorsement of religion and is not sufficient to
render the practice invalid under the Establishment Clause.
C.

Invocations and Benedictions at the District.’s
Graduation
Practice

Ceremonies

Requires

Are

Little

Const_itutional
State

Because

Surveillance

and

the
No

Funding.

The District’s practice is constitutional under the third
prong of Lemon because it does not involve supervision or funding
sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement with any
religious institution.
degree.

Entanglement is a question of kind and

Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 684.

To determine whether the

government’s entanglement with religion is excessive, the Court
examines:

1) the character and purpose of the benefited

institution; 2) the nature of the state aid provided; and 3) the
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resulting relationship between government and the religious
authority.

Lemon. 403 U.S. at 615.

A practice which requires

"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance" amounts to excessive entanglement between church
and state.

Id. at 619.

No state surveillance or funding of the

type or degree evidenced in Lemon is found in the case at bar.
In Lemon, a Pennsylvania statute which provided for state
aid to private schools in the form of subsidized teachers’
salaries, student text books, and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects, failed the excessive entanglement
test.

Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.

In the same decision, the Court also

held that a Rhode Island statute under which the state
supplemented fifteen percent of private elementary school
teachers’ annual salaries was invalid due to excessive
entanglement between the state and sectarian schools.

Id.

The Lemon Court based its decision on the following findings
of fart:

the majority of schools benefited were church-

affiliated; the monetary form of aid was allocated to schools or
to teachers in schools whose purpose was largely to inculcate
impressionable elementary school students with religious
doctrine; and both statutes provided for careful surveillance by
state authorities to ensure that the state aid supported only
secular education.

Id. at 619, 621.

The "intimate and

continuing relationship between church and state" necessary to
ensure the state aid supported only secular education was found
excessive and therefore unconstitutional under the Establishment
17

Clause.

Id. at 622.

Applying the excessive entanglement analysis formulated in
Lemon to the case at bar shows that the District's practice has
none of the elements of "comprehensive* discriminating* and
continuing” entanglement the court found excessive in Lemon.
at 619.

Id.

First, the practice benefits no identifiable religious

institution.

The speakers are either clergy persons from

different denominations, or lay persons.

The language of the

invocations and benedictions is nonsectarian and the ceremonies
at which they are delivered take place at the high schools, not
at any church-affiliated establishment.
Second, the District provides no aid, monetary or otherwise,
to the speakers or to their affiliate churches.
persons speak voluntarily.

The clergy

No district funds are allocated for

the purpose of providing invocations and benedictions or to
supervise the activity.
Third, the District does not have any ongoing contact with
any religious institution concerning the invocations and
benedictions.

The only contact the District has with any

religious institution is when, once a year* the school official
calls the speaker whom the students have selected and invites him
or her to speak.

No other contact between the District and any

religious institution is necessary, nor does it occur.
As the Sands court correctly concluded, the District’s
practice of including invocations and benedictions at its high
school graduation ceremonies "will not foster excessive
18

entanglement." and is therefore constitutional under the third
prong of Lemon.
II.

Sands. 214 Cal* App. 3d at 60.

BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER OTHER ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS
SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT.
Although the Lemon test has been applied to the majority of

Establishment Clause cases, the Court has been "unwilling[] to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."
Lynch. 465 U.S. at 679.

One alternative test was developed in

Lynch. 465 U.S. 668, and County of Allegheny. 109 S. Ct, 3086.
While Lynch examined whether the challenged practice withstood a
Lemon analysis, the focus of the Lynch court»s inquiry was on the
creche in the context of the holiday season, and whether, given
that context, the practice constituted the establishment of
religion.

Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 679.

County of Allegheny,

following Lynch. dispensed with a Lemon analysis and applied the
contextual test exclusively in determining whether the practice
endorsed religion.

County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086.

We

have already shown that the District’s practice withstands the
contextual test in our discussion of the purpose prong of Lemon.

Another test was set forth by the Court in Marsh v^
Chambers. 463 U.S. 783, a case directly analogous to the one at
bar.

The Court did not "consider [a Demon] analysis relevant

in

deciding whether legislative invocations were constitutionally
permissible under the Establishment Clause.
679.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at

Rather, the Court applied an historical analysis, reasoning

that invocations have historically been accepted by our
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government as serving a permissible ceremonial function.

The

First Congress adopted the practice of opening legislative
sessions with invocations as early as 1789.
788.

Marsh. 463 U.S. at

Many members of that congressional body were participants

in the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
at 790.

Id.

While historical patterns alone do not justify

constitutional violations, the historical context in which
legislative invocations were adopted "sheds light not only on
what the drafters . .

. intended the Establishment Clause to mean

but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice
[of legislative invocations]."

Id. at 783.

The Marsh court thus upheld the Nebraska state legislature’s

100

year practice of opening each session with a prayer delivered

by a chaplain, finding that it did not constitute an endorsement
of religion.

The Court reasoned that it would be "incongruous to

interpret that Clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment
limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal
Government."

Id. at 790-91.

It would likewise be incongruous to interpret the
Establishment Clause as imposing a stricter standard on a
government body such as the Morongo Unified School District,
operating under the auspices of the state government, than the
standard imposed on the state and federal goverments.
Petitioners argue that the Marsh decision only narrowly applies
to legislative invocations.

However, Justice O’Connor’s

concurrence in Lynch. which likened the legitimate secular
20

purpose of legislative invocations to courtroom invocations,
suggests that the Marsh decision may be interpreted to validate
invocations in general.

Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring).
The District’s practice, therefore, withstands scrutiny
under other Establishment Clause tests set out by the Court.
Even if this court found the practice invalid under any prong of
the Lemon test, it is nonetheless valid under the equally
legitimate contextual and historical tests.
III.

BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES
NOT ANALOGOUS TO SCHOOL PRAYER CASES BECAUSE THEY ARE
NOT REPETITIVE, THEY OCCUR OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM SETTING,
AND PARENTS ARE PRESENT TO SUPERVISE,

are

The stricter standard the courts usually employ for
monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in the school
setting is not applicable to the issue of including invocations
and benedictions in high school graduation ceremonies.

The

District recognizes that the courts are particularly vigilant
about Establishment Clause cases involving schools due to the
impressionable age of the recipients and the lack of parental
supervision and parental ability to intervene against practices
which contradict the family’s beliefs.
V

U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).

Edwards

vl*—Aguillard,

482

The District’s practice, however, is

more appropriately scrutinized under an analysis of permissible
ceremonial practices than under a school prayer analysis.
The Court has invalidated school prayer policies which
compel public school children to affirmatively comply with
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repetitive, pedagogical religious practices, because they have
the effect of endorsing religion and lack any clearly secular
purpose.

See Wallace» 472 U.S. 38; Abington, 374 U.S. 203;

Engel. 370 U.S. 421.

Invocations, on the other hand, have been

interpreted as a form of governmental acknowledgement of religion
that serves "the legitimate secular purpose[] of solemnizing
public occasions."

Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring).
Unlike the school prayers struck down in Wallace, Abipgton,
and Engel. the District’s practice of including invocations and
benedictions is not an affirmative religious activity mandated by
the District to be performed daily.

It contains no repetitive or

pedagogical function that characterizes school prayer cases, nor
any element of calculated indoctrination.

The ceremonies are a

once a year occurrence, once in a lifetime for most graduates.
The District does not write the text nor mandate that the
speakers represent any particular sect.

Rather, the District

requests that the speakers include only nonsectarian language,
which is consistent with the Mar^ decision.

Attendees at the

ceremonies are not required to recite the invocations or
benedictions, nor to respond to them.
Even the Supreme Court has distinguished between official
public school prayers promulgated in cases such as Engel., 370
U.S. 421, and "patriotic or ceremonial" practices in which school
children and others are officially encouraged to recite anthems
or read historical documents such as the Declaration of
22

Independence I which contain references to faith in a deity.
at 435 n.21.

Id.

"Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no

true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the
State of New York has sponsored in rEngel 1. "

Id.

Additional support for interpreting invocations and
benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies as
distinguishable from other school prayer cases is found in many
federal appellate and district court decisions on point.
Stein

V.

See

Plainwell Community Schools. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.

1987); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School Dist._. 342 F. Supp.
1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972); and Grossberg v. Deusebio. 380 F. Supp, 285
(E.D. Va. 1974).
exercises . .

As the Stein court reasoned, "annual graduation

• are analogous to the legislative and judicial

sessions referred to in Marsh and should be governed by the same
principles!,]" even though a school function is involved.

St_ein,

822 F.2d at 1409.
The lower courts based their decisions on facts directly
analogous to the facts in the case at bar.

Many students in the

District’s high school graduation ceremonies have achieved
adulthood, so their impressionability is not a significant
concern for the court.

Additionally, the ceremonies take place

after school hours in non-classroom settings, in the presence of
the students’ parents.

Thus, the court’s usual concerns for the

inculcating effect of the teacher-student relationship and lack
of parental supervision are also not relevant considerations in
evaluating the effect of invocations and benedictions in the high
23

school graduation context.

The District's practice bears none of

the characteristics found invalid in school prayer cases and
should be governed by the principles used to determine legitimate
ceremonial practices«
IV.

THE PRACTICE OF INCLUDING BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS
at graduation CEREMONIES IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE I,
SECTION 4 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT A
LAW RESPECTING ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND IT DOES NOT
EXHIBIT A PREFERENCE FOR RELIGION.
Although we have demonstrated that the District’s inclusion

of brief invocations and benedictions is valid under the United
States Constitution’s Establishment Clause, a further examination
of the challenged practice is necessary to show that it is valid
under the Establishment and No Preference Clauses of the
California Constitution.

Cal. Const, art. I, § 4.

This

additional analysis is compelled by article I» section 24 of the
California Constitution which states that "[rlights guaranteed by
this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution."

Cal. Const, art. I, § 24.

Through article I, section 4, the California Constitution
provides somewhat greater protection than does the United States
Constitution because it not only proscribes all laws respecting
establishment of religion, but also guarantees that there will be
no preference for one religion over another.
796.

F^, 22 Cal. 3d at

"By its express terms, what [article I, section 4] mandates

is the perpetual guaranty of the *[f]ree exercise and enjoyment’
of religion; what it prohibits is 'discrimination* against,

*or

preference’ in favor of, one religion as opposed to another.”
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Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596| 617 (1976).
The District’s inclusion of brief invocations and
benedictions at its graduation ceremonies does not violate the
United States Constitution’s Establishment Clause and an analysis
of the parallel provision of the California Constitution compels
the same result.

Because there are few California cases which

explore in detail the Establishment Clause of the state s
constitution, California courts have "consult[ed] principles of
federal cases as they seem compelling guides to uncharted state
grounds,"

Feminist Women’s Health Center_v_t—Phijibosi^, 157

Cal. App. 3d 1076, 1086 (1984).

Accordingly, the analysis

developed above, which examined federal cases to conclude that
the challenged practice is permissible under the federal
Establishment Clause, is also appropriate for an analysis of the
Establishment Clause of article I, section 4 of the California
Constitution.
A separate analysis is required to address the No Preference
Clause of the California Constitution.

Even under this arguably

more stringent provision prohibiting a preference for one
religion over another, the District’s practice withstands
scrutiny.

The preference test as established in £ox, 22 Cal. 3d

792, and developed in Okrand. 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, is applied in
determining whether a "governmental action exhibits a preference
for a religion or a religious belief."

Okrand, 207 Cal. App. 3d

at 579 (citing Fox. 22 Cal. 3d at 796).

The California Supreme Court has not yet applied the
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preference test to a case with facts similar to those in the
present case.

However, the reasoning used by the court in Okrand

is analogous to the situation here.

The court applied the

preference test in Okrand and upheld as constitutional the city
hall’s holiday display of a menorah.

Id. at 579.

The court

indicated that while the menorah is central to the celebration of
Chanukah, it "does not readily focus attention on a religious
doctrine . . . ."

Id. at 580.

Furthermore, the display "showed

no more preference for Judaism than display of the Christmas tree
showed for Christianity."

Id. at 579.

The city’s willingness to display a variety of religious
symbols supports the Okrand court’s conclusion that no preference
was exhibited.

The menorah was displayed together with other

religious symbols.

Id.

In Fox, the court found unconstitutional

the illumination of a Latin cross in the windows of the city hall
tower because it was "preferential when comparable recognition of
other religious symbols [was] impracticable."
797.

Fox. 22 Cal. 3d at

The impracticability which troubled the court in Fox was

absent in Okrand.
The analysis used by the Okrand court compels a similar
result in the case at bar.

Application of the preference test to

the case at bar shows that the District does not exhibit a
preference for religion by including brief invocations and
benedictions at its high school graduation ceremonies.

As was

the city in Okrand. the District is willing to recognize various
religions.

Although historically the invocations and
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benedictions have been delivered by clergy from Christian faiths,
the students* participation in selection of speakers allows for
speakers who represent no religion or those who represent
different religions.
The California Constitution does not require that every
religion be represented in every situation.
797.

Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at

The fact that the Christian religion has been the

predominant religion among the speakers chosen for the graduation
ceremonies does not indicate a preference for the Christian
religion.

Rather, it reflects the choice freely exercised by the

District’s graduating students.
The District does not have a policy requiring the speakers
to be clergy persons, nor does it determine the content of the
invocations or benedictions.

Both Twenty-Nine Palms and Yucca

Valley allow graduating seniors to select the speakers for the
graduation ceremonies.

At Twenty-Nine Palms, a student selection

committee chooses the speakers and makes the final selection.

At

Yucca Valley, the vice principal assists the senior class
president in making the choice, and the principal has the right
of final selection.

While a school official intervened and

requested that a member of the clergy be chosen for the
invocation at Yucca Valley in 1986, this request was made
specifically to maintain the status quo following the initiation
of this litigation.

The students complied with the request and

selected a pastor to deliver the invocation.
One exhibits a preference when one selects
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someone or

something over another or others."
1033 ( 1979).

American Heritage Dictionary

In the case at bar, there is no evidence that any

religious group seeking to deliver an invocation or benediction
has ever been denied its request.

Where no one has been denied

the opportunity to speak, a preference has not been exercised.
There is no indication in the record that the District would
prohibit a speaker chosen by the students because he or she might
not represent any religious group or might represent a religion
practiced by only a minority of the students.
Consideration of the above factors supports a determination
that the District has not exhibited a preference for religion.
The District is only minimally involved in the speaker selection
process.

It has no policies regarding who shall be selected nor

what the content of the invocations and benedictions shall be.
The District has not denied speaker status to representatives of
any particular religion, nor is there evidence that it would if
such a request were made.

When evaluated under the preference

test, it is clear that the District has not exhibited a
preference in violation of article I, section 4 of the California
Constitution.
V.

THE INCLUSION OF BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT
GRADUATION CEREMONIES IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 5 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THE
DISTRICT DOES NOT GRANT ANYTHING IN AID OF A RELIGIOUS
PURPOSE.
The District’s inclusion of invocations and benedictions at

high school graduation ceremonies complies with the stringent
requirements of Article XVI, section 5 of the California
28

Constitution.

The relevant portion of article XVI, section 5

reads, "iNjeither the Legislature, nor any . . . school district
. . • shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public
fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious
sect ... or sectarian purpose . . . ."
5.

Cal. Const, art. XVI, §

The inclusion of brief invocations and benedictions is

permissible because:

1) no District funds are spent in order to

include them in the graduation ceremonies, and 2) while the
District’s involvement in the ceremonies may be official, it does
not directly or substantially promote any religious purpose and
it does not implicate the District’s authority.

Consequently,

the District’s historical and traditional practice meets the
standards set forth by article XVI, section 5.
The California Supreme Court developed a test for courts to
apply in determining the effect on religion, and thus the
constitutionality of a state activity challenged as violating
article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution.

The court

interpreted article XVI, section 5 to "bani] any official
involvement, whatever its form, which has the direct, immediate,
and substantial effect of promoting religious purposes."
12 Cal. 3d at 605 n.l2.

Priest.

The statute challenged in Priest

provided private institutions of higher education with financial
assistance to build new facilities.

Priest. 12 Cal. 3d at 596.

The court in Priest determined that the challenged statute did
not violate article XVI, section 5 of the California Constitution
because it did not have "a substantial effect of supporting
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religious activities,

Id. at 606.

The court added further

definition to the Priest test in Fox v. City of Los Angeles.

In

Fox. the court interpreted article XVI, section 5 to forbid "all
forms of governmental aid to religion, whether that aid be in the
tangible form of cash or in the intangible form of prestige and
power."

Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 802 (Bird, C.J., concurring)

(emphasis in original).
The California Supreme Court has not yet applied article
XVI, section 5 to a situation factually similar to the one before
the court today.

However, the test developed in Pries.t and F^

consistently has been applied to cases where a practice is
challenged as violating article XVI, section 5.

Application of

the test to the facts in the present case will show that the
District's inclusion of invocations and benedictions is
constitutionally permissible.
First, the District’s practice complies with article XVI,
section 5 because no public funds are appropriated for the
inclusion of the invocations and benedictions in the graduation
ceremonies.

The costs attributable to the graduation budget are

spent on faculty cap and gown rental, program printing costs, and
security.

All the funds the District spent would have been spent

regardless of whether invocations and benedictions were included
in the graduation ceremonies.

In addition, the speakers at the

ceremonies volunteer their time.

As a result, the District does

not appropriate funds in violation of article XVI, section 5 of
the California Constitution.
30

Second, application of the test from Priest and Fox to the
case at bar shows that the invocations and benedictions do not
have the substantial or direct effect of promoting religious
purposes, nor do they provide intangible aid by enlisting the
District’s authority or prestige.

Article XVI, section 5 does

not require governmental hostility toward religion.
Cal. 3d at 605.

Priest. 12

Any aid to a religious purpose which may result

from inclusion of the invocations and benedictions is at most
indirect and insubstantial.

The graduation ceremonies are

school-sponsored and therefore the District’s involvement may be
characterized as official.

However, many characteristics of the

graduation ceremonies combine to render any aid to a religious
purpose insubstantial.
ninety minutes.

The ceremonies last from forty-five to

In contrast, the invocations and benedictions

last from thirty to sixty seconds.

The latter are included for

the secular purpose of establishing a solemn and formal tone for
the proceedings.

Moreover, the language of the invocations and

benedictions is nonsectarian.
Furthermore, the District’s authority and prestige are not
implicated directly or indirectly for several reasons.

The

District plays a limited role in selection of the speakers and
does not review the content of the invocations and benedictions.
The fact that speakers are not compensated lends further support
to a determination that the District’s authority and prestige are
not implicated.

Additionally, the brevity of the invocations and

benedictions and their inclusion in an otherwise secular context
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make it highly unlikely that anyone in the audience will perceive
the District to have aligned itself with a religious purpose.
Because the District does not place its authority or prestige
behind the invocations and benedictions, and it is not perceived
as doing so, the inclusion of the invocations and benedictions is
permissible under article XVI, section 5 of the California
Constitution.
VI.

BRIEF INVOCATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS AT GRADUATION CEREMONIES
ARE PERMISSIBLE UNDER ARTICLE IX, SECTION 8 OF THE
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY NEITHER DIRECTLY NOR
INDIRECTLY TEACH A SECTARIAN DOCTRINE.
The District’s practice is constitutionally permissible when

analyzed according to article IX, section 8 of the California
Constitution.

Article IX, section 8 provides, '*[n]o public money

shall ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or
denominational school . . . nor shall any sectarian or
denominational doctrine be taught, or instruction thereon be
permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools
of this State."

Cal. Const, art. IX, § 8.

The relevant portion

of the section prohibits the teaching or instruction of religious
doctrine in public schools.
The facts in the case at bar compel the conclusion that the
District’s practice of including invocations and benedictions is
permissible under article IX, section 8 because it is not a
teaching of sectarian or denominational doctrine.

"Teach" means

"to conduct through a course of studies" or "to present in a
classroom lecture or discussion."
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Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 2346 (1986).

The speakers delivering

the invocations and benedictions are not teaching, but are simply
welcoming the students to the events through the invocations and
wishing them well at the conclusion of the events through the
benedictions.
Examination of the circumstances surrounding the graduation
ceremonies further illustrates that no teaching has occurred.
The invocations and benedictions are not delivered during regular
school hours when attendance is compulsory, but after school
hours at only one time in each student’s academic career.
Moreover, the graduation ceremonies do not take place in the
classroom, the usual venue for instruction.

At Yucca Valley, for

example, the graduation takes place on the football field.
of the students attend with their families.

Most

The potential for

unwanted instruction is nullified by the presence and supervision
of these families, with whom the students presumably share any
religious beliefs they may hold.

The delivery of brief

invocations and benedictions, lasting only thirty to sixty
seconds, simply cannot be viewed as teaching in the ordinary
sense of the word.

Neither the families, the faculty, nor the

students expects instruction, and they do not receive it.
It should be noted that the lower court’s reliance on the
Priest court’s application of article IX, section 8 was
misplaced.

The Priest decision concerned article IX, section 8

as it applies to sectarian schools.

The court there determined

that no public money had been spent in support of a sectarian
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school in violation of article IX, section 8.
App. 3d at 61-62.

Sands, 214 Cal.

The Sands court analogized directly to the

Priest decision and applied the same part of article IX, section
8.

Because there is no sectarian school involved in the case at

bar, as there was in Priest. the lower court’s application of
this provision as used in Priest was misplaced.

However, the

lower court’s mistake was harmless error, because as
demonstrated, the facts withstand scrutiny under the relevant
part of the provision.

The District’s inclusion of invocations

and benedictions in the graduation ceremonies does not constitute
direct or indirect teaching of denominational doctrine in the
schools and therefore does not violate article IX, section 8 of
the California Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The District’s practice of including brief invocations and
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is
constitutional under the federal Establishment Clause because:
1) its purpose is sufficiently secular when viewed in its
ceremonial context; 2) it does not have the effect of endorsing
religion and any promotional effect it has on religion is at most
incidental and remote; and 3) no supervision or funding
sufficient to constitute excessive entanglement with a religious
institution is involved in the practice.

The practice is also

constitutional as a permissible ceremonial religious function.
Furthermore, the District’s practice of including
invocations and benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies
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is permissible under the California Constitution.
does not exhibit a preference for religion.

The District

It does not spend

any funds to support the inclusion of invocations and
benedictions, nor does it promote, or appear to implicate its
authority in support of, any religious purpose.

Finally,

delivery of the invocations and benedictions does not teach a
sectarian doctrine.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents pray this court to
affirm the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and to
hold that the District's practice of including invocations and
benedictions in its high school graduation ceremonies is
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution and under article I, section 4; article XVI,
section 5; and article IX, section 8 of the California
Constitution.
Dated:

October 25, 1990

35

